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The DPRK treats its nuclear programme as a sovereign, non-negotiable core of national security, and rejects the idea that it should be subject to meaningful external verification or openness. In practice, it has refused intrusive international inspections and provides no credible transparency about its facilities or stockpile – offering only controlled, selective disclosures for political messaging rather than independent oversight.
During the visit to Unmanned Aeronautical Technology Complex and the detective electronic warfare research group in March 2025, Kim Jong-un emphasized that “무력현대화건설에서 무인장비와 인공지능기술분야는 최우선적으로 중시하고 발전시켜야 할 부문 [in the effort to modernize the armed forces, the sectors of unmanned equipment and AI technology must be regarded as top priorities for development]” and that “지능화된 무인기들을 군사력의 주요수단으로 리용하기 위한 경쟁이 가속화되고 군사활동에서 그 사용범위가 부단히 확대되고있는 현대전의 추이에 맞게 이 사업의 가급적발전을 도모하기 위한 국가적인 전망계획을 정확히 작성하고 중장기적인 사업으로 인내성있게 강력히 추진해나가는것이 중요하다 [as the competition to use AI-enabled drones as major military assets is accelerating and the scope of their use in military activities is constantly expanding in modern warfare, it is important to formulate a long-term national plan to promote this rapid development and to push it forward vigorously and patiently as a mid- to long-term project.]”(d)
At the opening ceremony of the Arms Equipment Exhibition in October 2025, Kim stressed the importance for “인공지능기술을 비롯한 최신과학기술들이 적극 도입되여 전쟁수행능력의 견지에서 현행은 물론 미래의 전장에 대한 적응가능성도 확충하게 된것… [actively introducing AI and other cutting-edge technology which could not only expand our warfighting capabilities but also our adaptability to current and future battlefields.].”(e)
Moreover, academic papers shows that DPRK is studying how to measure distance and recognize obstacles when operating autonomous robots and is researching improvements in detection of intrusive cyber operations via artificial neural networks and genetic algorithms.(b,c) [1,2,3,4]
There are no official records released by the DPRK government regarding the number of nuclear-capable (including dual-capable) delivery vehicles it possesses. The DPRK news agencies focus on reporting missile test launches or the unveiling of new relevant weapons systems. During the recent military parade marking the 80th founding anniversary of the Worker’s Party of Korea, the Hwasongpho-20 ICBM was presented as “최강의 핵전략무기체계 [the most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system]”.(a)
There is also a lack of unofficial estimates on their numbers; instead, most analyses focus on the ranges and types of delivery vehicles and whether they are under development or in operation. [1,2,3]
The DPRK reveals limited information on occasions such as missile launch tests, visits to key military facilities, and major national events, including the recent military parade marking the 80th founding anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.(d) It is believed by the expert community and intelligence agencies that the DPRK has achieved a level of miniaturization of its nuclear warheads sufficient for mounting them on various delivery systems, ranging from short-range ballistic missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.[1,2,3,4]
The DPRK has previously claimed to have conducted its third nuclear test with a “소형화, 경량화된 원자탄 [smaller, lighter atomic bomb].” and has emphasized the importance of developing “정밀화, 소형화된 핵무기들과 그 운반수단들을 더 많이 만들… [more precise and miniaturized nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and by advancing nuclear weapons technology].”(a,b) Moreover, in 2021, Kim Jong-un stated the intention to “이미 축적된 핵기술이 … 전술무기화 [make the existing nuclear weapons tactical ones].”(c)
Overall, information from the DPRK regarding its delivery vehicles remains limited, making it difficult to determine which systems are operational and which are assigned for nuclear missions. The DPRK occasionally implies such roles in news reports related to weapon testing. For instance, according to the DPRK’s only English-language newspaper, The Pyongyang Times, “Guiding the test-fire of Padasuri-6 ground-to-sea missile to be furnished for the Navy and the test launch of the submarine-launched strategic cruise missile Pulhwasal-3-31… made sure … that the Navy was armed with nuclear weapons and that the sphere of operation of the state nuclear deterrent was expanded in a diversified way.”(d)
The DPRK does not disclose information about the types of fissile material production or reprocessing facilities it possesses that are used for nuclear weapons purposes. There are limited mentioning by the DPRK’s state news agency regarding the rough location occasionally. For instance, the already known 5 MWe reactor according to the Agreed Framework signed between the DPRK and the USA in 1994 is located in 녕변 [Nyongbyon].(a,b)
There are also occasionally mentioning about the names of the facilities that produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. During the 2019 Hanoi Summit negotiation, the US state department official has mentioned that “What they [the DPRK] had offered in return was the dismantlement of the Yongbyon [Nyongbyon] nuclear complex.”1 There are also mentioning of 핵무기 연구소 [Nuclear Weapons Institute]. Kim Jong-un has paid two visits so far this year to inspect the nuclear-material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute.(d)
The DPRK does not disclose its total holdings, in each category, of low-enriched uranium, highly-enriched uranium, and plutonium. It does mention about the importance to increase production.
While no official records have been released by the DPRK government, expert estimates are primarily based on the plutonium production capacity of the 5 MWe reactor.(a)2 This reactor is believed to be capable of producing about 6 kg of plutonium per year.1 Moreover, the DPRK has claimed efforts to build an experimental light-water reactor in response to the 2009 April the presidential statement by the United Nation Security Council, “유엔안전보장리사회가 즉시 사죄하지 않는 경우 우리는…둘째로, 경수로발전소건설을 결정하고 그 첫 공정으로서 핵연료를 자체로 생산보장하기 위한 기술개발을 지체없이 시작할것이다 [In case the UNSC does not make an immediate apology, we will…Secondly, decide to build a light-water reactor power plant and begin immediately the technological development to ensure our own production of nuclear fuel].”(b)
The DPRK states the reactor is intended primarily for electricity generation, but the expert community has raised concerns that it could be repurposed for plutonium production.3 If it were operated on a weapons-sensitive fuel cycle, it could produce up to 20 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year.2
Regarding uranium enrichment, as early as 2010 there were news reports about the DPRK’s “수천대규모의 원심분리기를 갖춘 [possession of thousands of centrifuges].”(c) More recently, during an inspection visit by Kim Jong-un to the Nuclear Weapons Institute, photos were released showing him touring the control room of a uranium enrichment facility.(f) Based on the number of centrifuges visible in those images, experts have estimated that the facility houses at least 2,000 centrifuges, though it remains unclear whether all of them are operational and if those are all centrifuges it possesses.5
At the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2021, Kim Jong-un announced the modernization plan for the next five year to “핵기술을 더욱 고도화하는 한편 핵무기의 소형경량화, …전술핵무기들을 개발하고 초대형핵탄두생산도 지속적으로 밀고나감 [further advance nuclear technology, the miniaturization and lightweighting of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and the production of ultra-large nuclear warheads].” This plan also include the “1만 5, 000㎞ 사정권안의 임의의 전략적대상들을 정확히 타격소멸하는 명중률을 더욱 제고하여 핵선제 및 보복타격능력을 고도화할데 대한 목표가 제시되였다. [goal to improve the preemptive and retaliatory strike of nuclear forces…within the 15,000 km]” and ”가까운 기간내에 극초음속활공비행전투부를 개발…수중 및 지상고체발동기대륙간탄도로케트개발사업을 계획대로 추진시키며 핵장거리타격능력을 제고하는데서 중요한 의의를 가지는 핵잠수함과 수중발사핵전략무기를 보유할데 대한 과업이상정되였다 [task to develop hypersonic gliding flight warhead, ground-based and sea-based solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-powered submarine and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon which are of important significance in raising the long-range nuclear striking capability].”(a)
Kim has stressed that the country will pursue “핵무장화의 급진적인 확대 [a rapid expansion of nuclearization]” and emphasized the important role of naval forces to perform as a part of “앞날에국가핵무력구성과 핵사용령역에서 일익을 굳건히 담당하는 믿음직한 력량으로 될것이라 [state nuclear forces and the realm of nuclear use in the near future].”(c)
Another five-year plan is expected to be included for the 2026 Ninth Party Congress.
While still limited, the DPRK has released more information about its nuclear and other weapons-related development compared to the past. This is likely aimed partly at domestic audiences to reinforce regime legitimacy, and partly at international audiences for deterrence purposes. When examining the official statements released after the six nuclear tests, the rationale for each test has gradually become firmer and more detailed, offering glimpses of how the DPRK frames the development and direction of its nuclear programme. For the fourth nuclear test, which it described as its first hydrogen bomb test, the DPRK provided a clearer timeline for issuing the test order. Kim Jong-un “주체104(2015)년 12월 15일 주체조선의 첫 수소탄시험을 진행할데 대한 명령을 하달하신데 이어 주체105(2016)년 1월 3일 최종명령서에 수표하시였다. [issued an order to conduct the first H-bomb test … on December 15, Juche 104 (2015) … and then signed the final written order on January 3, Juche 105 (2016)].”(e) The fourth nuclear test occurred on the 6th of January in 2016.(f) After the fifth nuclear test, the announcement further stressed the direction of its nuclear weapons development, stating that “핵탄두가 표준화, 규격화됨으로써 우리는 여러가지 분렬물질에 대한 생산과 그 리용기술을 확고히 틀어쥐고 소형화, 경량화, 다종화된 보다 타격력이 높은 각종 핵탄두들을 마음먹은대로 필요한만큼 생산할수 있게 되였으며 … [The standardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power with a firm hold on the technology for producing and using various fissile materials].”(g) Throughout all six tests, however, the emphasis has remained consistent on safe testing conditions and the self-defensive nature of the nuclear and missile programmes. (a,b,c,f,g,h)
Moreover, in comparing the DPRK’s nuclear force laws, the 2022 law is a more elaborated document than the 2013 “자위적핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할데 대하여 [On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defence]”.(d) The 2022 version provides clearer command-and-control provisions for nuclear use and repeatedly emphasizes the DPRK’s status as a ‘responsible nuclear state’.(i)
At the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong-un reiterated the rejection of the concept of denuclearization, stating that “《비핵화》라는 개념은 이미 그 의미를 상실하였습니다… 이제 《비핵화》를 하라는것은 우리더러 위헌행위를 하라는것입니다. 단언하건대 우리에게서《비핵화》라는것은 절대로, 절대로 있을수 없습니다. [The concept of denuclearization has already lost its meaning…Asking us to accept denuclearization now is as good as asking us to go against our Constitution… denuclearization is the last, last thing to expect from us].”(j)
Overall, the information the DPRK releases seems calibrated to serve its strategic purposes, offering enough detail to signal confidence and deterrence. At present, understanding the status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and related activities relies largely on open-source intelligence tools, particularly commercial satellite imagery.[1,2]
According to its 2022 Law on Nuclear Force, the DPRK shall not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states if these states are not involved in “다른 핵무기보유국과 야합하여 조선민주주의인민공화국을 바대하는 침략이나 공격형위에 가담하지 않는한 [any aggression or attack against the DPRK in league with other nuclear-armed states].”(a)
Apart from this general provision specifically mentioning non-nuclear-armed states, under Article 6, this Law outlines five conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, regardless of whether the state is nuclear-armed or not: 1 조선민주주의인민공화국에 대한 핵무기 또는 기타 대량살륙무기공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear weapon or other weapons of mass destruction attack against the DPRK is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 2 국가지도부와 국가핵무력지휘기구에 대한 적대세력의 핵 및 비핵공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the nuclear force command organization of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 3 국가의 중요전략적대상들에 대한 치명적인 군사적공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a lethal military attack against key strategic targets of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 4 유사시 전쟁의 확대와 장기화를 막고 전쟁의 주도권을 장악하기 위한 작전상필요가 불가피하게 제기되는 경우 [in the event of an contingency, if an operational necessity inevitably arises to prevent the expansion and prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war]; 5 기타 국가의 존립과 인민의 생명안전에 파국적인 위기를 초래하는 사태가 발생하여 핵무기로 대응할수밖에 없는 불가피한 상황이 조성되는 경우 [if any other situation arises that poses a catastrophic crisis threatens the survival of the state and the lives and safety of its people, resulting in an unavoidable situation that compels a nuclear response].(a)
The DPRK has disclosed its nuclear laws twice: once in 2013 titled “자위적핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할데 대하여 [On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defence]” and in 2022, which replaced the 2013 law, titled “조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책 [The DPRK’s Nuclear Force Policy].” (a,b,c)
Under Article 6 of the 2022 law, it outlines five conditions when the DPRK would use its nuclear weapons: 1 조선민주주의인민공화국에 대한 핵무기 또는 기타 대량살륙무기공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear weapon or other weapons of mass destruction attack against the DPRK is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 2 국가지도부와 국가핵무력지휘기구에 대한 적대세력의 핵 및 비핵공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the nuclear force command organization of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 3 국가의 중요전략적대상들에 대한 치명적인 군사적공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a lethal military attack against key strategic targets of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 4 유사시 전쟁의 확대와 장기화를 막고 전쟁의 주도권을 장악하기 위한 작전상필요가 불가피하게 제기되는 경우 [in the event of an contingency, if an operational necessity inevitably arises to prevent the expansion and prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in the war]; 5 기타 국가의 존립과 인민의 생명안전에 파국적인 위기를 초래하는 사태가 발생하여 핵무기로 대응할수밖에 없는 불가피한 상황이 조성되는 경우 [if any other situation arises that poses a catastrophic crisis threatens the survival of the state and the lives and safety of its people, resulting in an unavoidable situation that compels a nuclear response].(c)
The DPRK government does not issue pre-notification of its missile tests and other related activities. There are usually follow up news outlet confirming and sharing more information related the tests and exercises afterwards on the same day.(a,b,c,e,f,g)
Particularly for the fourth nuclear test and also the its first Hydrogen bomb test, the DPRK has shared a clearer timeline for issuing the order to conduct the test. Kim Jong-Un has “주체104(2015)년 12월 15일 주체조선의 첫 수소탄시험을 진행할데 대한 명령을 하달하신데 이어 주체105(2016)년 1월 3일 최종명령서에 수표하시였다. [issued an order to conduct the first H-bomb test … on December 15, Juche 104 (2015) … and then signed the final written order on January 3, Juche 105 (2016)].”(d) The fourth nuclear test occurred on the 6th of January in 2016.(e)
According to its 2022 Law on Nuclear Force, three out of the five conditions when the DPRK would use its nuclear weapons included general information related to the types of weapons that might be used by an adversary.(a) The DPRK does not go into the details in terms of mentioning the specific types of strategic non-nuclear technologies but they should be included as part of non-nuclear attacks.
In specific, under the Article 6 of this law, these three conditions are: 1 조선민주주의인민공화국에 대한 핵무기 또는 기타 대량살륙무기공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear weapon or other weapons of mass destruction attack against the DPRK is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 2 국가지도부와 국가핵무력지휘기구에 대한 적대세력의 핵 및 비핵공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the nuclear force command organization of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent]; 3 국가의 중요전략적대상들에 대한 치명적인 군사적공격이 감행되였거나 림박하였다고 판단되는 경우 [if a lethal military attack against key strategic targets of the state is assessed to have been carried out or is imminent].(a)
While no official records have been released by the DPRK government, expert estimates are primarily based on or start with the plutonium production capacity of the 5 MWe reactor.[2,3,4,5] This reactor is believed to be capable of producing 6 kg of plutonium per year.1 Depending on the designs and sophistication of its nuclear weapons program, a nuclear bomb could require as little as 3.5 kg of plutonium.6 The existence of this reactor was acknowledged in the Agreed Framework signed between the DPRK and the USA in 1994.(a) Experts have estimated that the DPRK might have produced sufficient fissile material to potentially build up to 90 nuclear weapons but assembled around 50.6 However, the DPRK government has never acknowledged this estimation.
The DPRK has exceptionally mentioned the yield range of the reported hydrogen bomb at the sixth nuclear test in 2017. The Korean Central News Agency reported that “our hydrogen bomb, the explosive power of which is adjustable from tens of kilotons to hundreds of kilotons... [핵탄위력을 타격대상에 따라 수십kt급으로부터 수백kt급에 이르기까지 임의로 조정할 수 있는 우리의 수소탄은…]” and highlighted that the test demonstrated not only the “enormous destructive power [거대한 살상파괴력]” of the hydrogen bomb, but also its “strategic purpose to deliver a super-powerful EMP attack over a vast area [광대한 지역에 대한 초강력 EMP 공격].”(a) Moreover, the report emphasized a “Juche-oriented thermonuclear weapon [주체식 열핵무기]” that is “based on our own effort and technology [우리의 힘과 기술].” (a)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK highlighted that the success of the nuclear test “demonstrates that not only have our own nuclear bombs become highly precise, but the operational reliability of their nuclear warheads is firmly guaranteed; our nuclear weapons design and manufacturing technology has reached a high level that allows the power of nuclear bombs to be adjusted arbitrarily depending on the target and purpose of the strike. It is a very significant milestone in achieving the final-stage goal of completing the national nuclear force. [우리의 주체적인 핵탄들이 고도로 정밀화되였을뿐아니라 핵전투부의 동작믿음성이 확고히 보장되며 우리의 핵무기설계 및 제작기술이 핵탄의 위력을 타격대상과 목적에 따라 임의로 조정할수 있는 높은 수준에 도달하였다는것을 명백히 보여주었으며 국가핵무력완성의 완결단계목표를 달성하는데서 매우 의의있는 계기로 된다]”.(b)
Such statements emphasized self-reliance in nuclear weapons development, the reliability of the weapon system, and the strategic significance of the hydrogen bomb for the DPRK.