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Pakistan has not disclosed its policies and operational practices regarding the use of artificial intelligence in systems related to the development, deployment, and employment of nuclear weapons, including the systems related to early warning and nuclear command and control.
Pakistan is also in the process of learning and understanding the implications of integrating new technologies into the military systems. However, due to the sensitivities associated with the potential use of artificial intelligence in nuclear weapons and their associated systems, there is a likelihood that such technologies may not be integrated in the near future.
Pakistan has never disclosed the number of delivery vehicles for its land, air, and sea-based nuclear capabilities or the number of dual-capable delivery vehicles. It has not maintained separate inventory of nuclear-capable missiles and labels all nuclear capable delivery platforms as dual-capable.
Pakistan has classified all of its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles as dual-capable to retain the option of their use for conventional purposes. These systems are are also classified in terms of specific ranges which gives some idea of their likely employment. These ranges, however, are intended to cover the nature of threat from its eastern neighbor and does not go beyond 2750 kms.
Pakistan doesn't disclose information about the types of fissile material production or reprocessing facilities it possesses which that could be used for nuclear weapons purposes. Several unofficial reports have speculated about these facilities to understand Pakistan's fissile material production capacity but these estimates or their conclusions have never been endorsed by the official government sources.
Pakistan being a late starter in its nuclear weapons pursuit believes that its major rival India has advantage in terms of fissile production capacity and the existing stocks. It has therefore opted to maintain ambiguity about its production capacity and the type of fissile material produced, or being produced to meet the future requirements.
Pakistan's modernisation plan mainly depends on India's actions and its evolving conventional and nuclear capabilities. Its missile delivery systems and fissile material production capacity are all aimed to neutralise or counter India's overall military advantage and to maintain strategic balance in the region. It therefore become difficult to predict what new weapon systems or facilities would be needed to achieve these objectives.
Pakistan started its nuclear weapons pursuit much later than its main rival India. After becoming overt nuclear weapon state, Pakistan consolidated its nuclear deterrent by developing number of delivery systems, mainly in the form of ballistic missiles and later the cruise missiles that could be launched from land, air, and sea. It has nevertheless maintained secrecy over number of nuclear delivery systems and warheads and has provided no transparency about its existing potential or future development plans. Pakistan however does provide ranges of its cruise and ballistic missiles.
Pakistan has not declared its nuclear use doctrine officially but has provided sufficient transparency in its nuclear policy through official statements and press releases by the military side. There are no clearly defined red lines, but its nuclear posture is considered credible and has been able to achieve the desired result during the past few crises with India, which remains its principal adversary.
For nuclear delivery systems, Pakistan has developed different types of ballistic and cruise missiles that are often labelled as dual-capable but are generally believed to be dedicated mainly for nuclear use. The command and control of these delivery systems is with the National Command Authority (NCA), which comprises of senior political and military leadership and is headed by the Prime Minister. The NCA structure clearly outlines the authority for nuclear use, which is the Prime Minister, and these have been well published to bring clarity in the command-and-control system.
Pakistan adheres to its bilateral commitment of notifying test of all ballistic missiles. It has maintained principled stance on Negative Security Assurances and wants a legally binding arrangement to be concluded amongst all the nuclear armed states at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.
On the issue of fissile material, it has not declared its fissile material stocks, and neither the capacity and location of these facilities. Several independent analysts have offered different estimates about Pakistan’s weapon capabilities, but these have never been endorsed by Pakistan. On the issue of limiting fissile material production, Pakistan has maintained a consistent position that any treaty negotiated to stop further production of fissile material must also take into consideration the existing asymmetries of stocks.
On nuclear security related issues, Pakistan remained actively involved in the US-Russia led Nuclear Security Summit process and provided sufficient transparency on the measures taken at the national level to ensure nuclear safety and security of all facilities in the country.
On the potential integration of artificial intelligence in the nuclear command and control and the delivery systems, it is likely that Pakistan would remain reluctant due to likely implications for strategic stability. As one of the active proponents of the restricting lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), it is possible that it would resist the temptation of using new technologies in the nuclear systems.
Pakistan is the leading proponent for a Convention on legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs). It believed that the proposal for NSA is most ripe for treaty
negotiations and has the significant potential to create the necessary environment for
confidence building and easing of tensions. 1
Pakistan has not disclosed its policy regarding the employment of nuclear weapons and has maintained deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear use policy. Due to its conventional asymmetry with India, Pakistan has kept its nuclear threshold opaque and retained the option of a nuclear use. This means that it could consider the use of nuclear weapons, if its conventional military capability is considered insufficient to deal with the external threat.
Pakistan and India agreed to notify each other of any ballistic missile tests. This was concluded in 2005 and both countries continue to follow the practice. This agreement however doesn't include cruise missiles or space launch vehicles and the military exercises involving nuclear and dual-capable weapon systems.
The 2005 agreement has withheld despite the number of crises that both countries have experienced over the past two decades. 1
Pakistan's nuclear capability is poised to deter India's conventional as well as nuclear aggression and therefore there are no clearly defined red lines. With India's development of hypersonic weapons and anti-satellite weapons, there could be a possibility that Pakistan may consider developing nuclear options, in case India uses these strategic non-nuclear capabilities to threaten Pakistan's critical infrastructure, including the nuclear capability or the associated command, control and communication infrastructure.
The Government of Pakistan as a matter of policy does not declare the number of warheads in its inventory. Pakistan maintains ambiguity about its nuclear weapons program and has never disclosed the capacity of its nuclear facilities for producing fissile material stocks. A plausible reason for maintaining this ambiguity is that it doesn't want to engage in an arms race with its main rival India, which Pakistan believes has more production capacity for fissile material production and the warheads. Competing with India in numbers game, according to Pakistan would unnecessarily burden its limited resources.
Pakistan has never disclosed the yields of its warheads and has provided no information regarding its nuclear arsenal. There are speculations about the yields of its nuclear weapon tests conducted in 1998 but these were also never confirmed by the government.